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ABSTRACT 
 
 Using the standard real business cycle model with lump-sum taxes, we analyze 
the impact of fiscal policy when agents form expectations using adaptive 
learning rather than rational expectations (RE). The output multipliers for 
government purchases are significantly higher under learning, and fall within 
empirical bounds reported in the literature (in sharp contrast to the implausibly 
low values under RE). Effectiveness of fiscal policy is demonstrated during 
times of economic stress like the recent Great Recession. Finally it is shown 
how learning can lead to dynamics empirically documented during episodes of 
“fiscal consolidations.” 
JEL Classification: E62, D84, E21, E43. 
Keywords: Government Purchases, Expectations, Output Multiplier, Fiscal 
Consolidation, Taxation. 
 
 
1 Introduction
There has been a recent revival of interest in the eectiveness of scal policy
in the wake of policy measures enacted by governments all over the world to
combat the damaging eects of the “Great Recession”.1 Of course, interest
in scal policy is not a recent phenomenon; there were several studies in the
1980s and 90s examining their eects as in Barro and King (1984), Baxter
and King (1993), Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992). However,
with the advent of in ation targeting as a framework for monetary policy
adopted by leading central banks over the world, attention shifted to the
development of suitable monetary policies for low in ation and stable growth.
The eects from the subprime crisis in August 2007 and more dramatically
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 shattered belief in the
“Great Moderation” achieved since the late 1980s. With interest rates close
to zero and monetary policy seemingly proving ineective to tackle the eects
of the Great Recession, governments naturally turned their attention to scal
measures to combat the severe recessionary impacts on the economy.
These measures in turn have led to renewed interest in scal policy and
a fairly voluminous recent literature; see for instance Hall (2009), Barro and
Redlick (2011), Ramey (2011b), Ramey (2011a), Leeper, Traum, and Walker
(2011), and Coenen, Erceg, Freedman, Furceri, Kumhof, Lalonde, Laxton,
Linde, Mourougane, Muir, Mursula, Resende, Roberts, Roeger, Snudden,
Trabandt, and Veld (2012). One thread running through this literature is
measuring the eectiveness of scal policy through examinations of govern-
ment purchases multipliers in the context of exogenous changes in defense
spending. An example often used in these studies is that of a war that leads
to temporary increases in military expenditures. This interpretation is mod-
eled by a surprise temporary increase in government purchases as emphasized
in the earlier studies of Barro and King (1984), and Baxter and King (1993).
A common perception in the literature is that the standard neoclassical
(Real Business Cycle aka RBC) model is an inadequate model for the study
of this particular policy experiment. It is argued that the basic mechanism
through which a temporary increase in government purchases works its way
in the RBC model leads to the inescapable conclusion of very low output
multipliers that are well outside the range found in empirical studies; see,
1Among active scal strategies adopted in the US and UK include temporary tax cuts
and credits and large public works projects; see for instance Auerbach, Gale, and Harris
(2010).
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in particular, the forceful arguments on this point made by Hall (2009),
p. 185. The conclusion is that Keynesian or New Keynesian models with an
aggregate demand channel are needed to deliver sizable government spending
multipliers.
The recent analyses are almost invariably developed under the “rational
expectations” (RE) hypothesis. While not denying the potential importance
of aggregate demand channels of changes in government spending, a ques-
tion of considerable interest is the extent to which the generally small size
of multipliers in the RBC model depends on RE. This question is of im-
portance regardless on one’s views concerning the role of aggregate demand
channels, since most modern dynamic macroeconomic general equilibrium
models incorporate the neoclassical mechanisms that are central to the RBC
model.2
Thus, in the current paper we study t he impact of government purchases
in the standard RBC model with the sole modication that we replace RE
with agents who have incomplete information about the eects of policy
changes and are learning adaptively over time about these changes.3 As we
have argued in Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009) and in Mitra, Evans,
and Honkapohja (2011), the assumption of RE is very strong and unreal-
istic when analyzing policy changes. Economic agents need to have com-
plete knowledge of the underlying structure, both before and after the policy
change. They must also rationally and fully incorporate this knowledge in
their decision making, and do so under the assumption that other agents are
equally knowledgeable and equally rational. Our approach, in contrast, uses
an adaptive learning model in which agents have partial structural knowl-
edge. At each date agents’ consumption and labor supply choices depend
on the time path of expected future wages, interest rates and taxes. In line
with the standard literature of adaptive learning, we assume that agents’
forecasts of wages and interest rates are based on a statistical model, with
coe!cients updated over time using least-squares. However, for forecasting
future taxes agents use the path of future taxes under the assumption that
2For example, Leeper, Traum, and Walker (2011) report simulated multipliers for a
series of nested models in which the New Keynesian models are specied as generalizations
of the RBC model.
3For discussion of the adaptive learning approach and extensive references, see, for ex-
ample, Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Sargent (2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2011).
Policy change under learning has also been studied in Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon
(2001), Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Giannitsarou (2006).
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this is announced credibly by policymakers.
This approach seems very natural to us. The essence of the adaptive
learning approach is that agents do not understand the general equilibrium
considerations that govern the evolution of the central endogenous variables,
i.e. aggregate capital, aggregate labor and factor prices, and are therefore
assumed to forecast these variables statistically. On the other hand, agents
can be expected to immediately incorporate into their decisions the direct
implications of credible announcements of the paths of future taxes on their
future net incomes. Once we allow for adaptive learning in this fashion
it turns out that output multipliers for a temporary change in government
purchases are much higher for the standard RBC model than under RE, and
indeed are in line with the range provided by the empirical literature.
Using this approach, the eectiveness of scal policy undertaken during
times of economic stress (as during the Great Recession) is analyzed next.
We model a scenario designed to capture important features of scal policy
changes by governments to combat the Great Recession. We nd that output
multipliers of changes in government purchases continue to be high under
adaptive learning in contrast to the values found under RE. This suggests
that scal policy can be an eective stabilization tool in deep recessions. We
note that we are able to obtain these results within the standard RBC model
without the need to add any other frictions to the setup.
As a nal contribution we use the RBC model with learning to consider
the episodes of so-called “expansionary scal consolidations” that have been
widely studied since the seminal contribution of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990).
It is known that the RBC model under RE is unable to deliver dynamics of
consumption, and especially investment, that are consistent with the em-
pirical evidence during these scal episodes. However, the introduction of
adaptive learning leads to behavior of these variables which is consistent
with the evidence during these episodes. Thus, we are able to provide a sim-
ple theory that can explain the major features during these episodes without
the need for “special theories” for large versus small changes in scal pol-
icy. The need for simple theories to explain these episodes has been strongly
argued in Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli (2002).
Section 2 below gives a quick overview of the basic RBC model in the
presence of learning by agents and Section 3 elaborates on the learning mech-
anism used by agents. Section 4 analyzes the implications for multipliers of
changes in government purchases. Section 5 analyzes the eectiveness of s-
cal stimulus of the type conducted in the US during the Great Recession.
4
Section 6 describes how the introduction of learning in the RBC model can
give a better match to features of data observed during the “expansionary
scal consolidations.” The nal section concludes.
2 The Model
There is a representative household who has preferences over non-negative
streams of a single consumption good fw and leisure 1 qw given by
Hˆw{
"X
v=w
v3wX(fv> 1 qv)}> where X(fv> 1 qv) = ln fv +  ln(1 qv) (1)
Here Hˆw denotes potentially subjective expectations at time w for the future,
which agents hold in the absence of rational expectations. The analysis of
the model under RE is standard. When RE is assumed we indicate this by
writing Hw for Hˆw. Our presentation of the model is general in the sense that
it applies under learning as well as under RE. The form of the utility function
in (1) has been used frequently, e.g. Long and Plosser (1983).4
The household  ow budget constraint is
dw+1 = zwqw + uwdw  fw  k>w> where (2)
uw = 1  + un>w= (3)
Here dw is per capita household wealth at the beginning of time w, which
equals holdings of capital nw owned by the household less their debt (to other
households), esw> i.e. dw  nw  esw= uw is the gross interest rate for loans
made to other households, zw is the wage rate, fw is consumption, qw is labor
supply and k>w is per capita lump sum taxes. Equation (3) arises due to the
absence of arbitrage from loans and capital being perfect substitutes as stores
of value; un>w is the rental rate on capital goods, and  is the depreciation rate.
Households maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2)
which yields the Euler equation for consumption
f31w = Hˆwuw+1f31w+1= (4)
4King, Plosser, and Rebello (1988), emphasize that log utility for consumption is needed
for steady state labor supply along a balanced growth path.
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From the  ow budget constraint (2) we can get the intertemporal budget
constraint (in realized terms) assuming the relevant transversality condition
holds:
0 = uwdw +
"X
m=1
(Gw>w+m(w))31"w+m + "w> (5)
where Gw>w+m =
mQ
l=1
uw+l, m  1 and "w  zwqw  fw  k>w>
Note that (5) involves future choices of labor supply by the household
which can be eliminated to derive the linearized consumption function. For
this we make use of the static household rst order condition
(1 qw)31 = zwf31w =
This relationship can be used to substitute out qw+m in (5) and we can then
obtain an expected value intertemporal budget constraint
0 = uwdw + "w +
"X
m=1
Hˆw(Gw>w+m)31{zw+m  (1 + )fw+m  k>w+m}=
To obtain its optimal choice of consumption fw, the household is assumed
to use a consumption function based on a linearization around steady state
values. In particular, we assume agents linearize the expected value intertem-
poral budget constraint and the Euler equation around the initial steady state
values f¯> d¯> z¯> ¯k and u¯ = 31. This linearization point is natural since agents
can be assumed to have estimated precisely the steady state values before
the policy change that takes place.
As shown in Mitra, Evans, and Honkapohja (2011), substituting the lin-
earized Euler equation (4) into the intertemporal budget constraint, one ob-
tains the consumption function
(fw  f¯)
(1 + )
(1 ) = d¯(uw  u¯) + 
31(dw  d¯) (k>w  ¯k)
+(zw  z¯) (z¯  ¯k)Vuhw  V hk>w + Vzhw (6)
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where
Vuhw 
"X
m=1
m+1
mX
l=1
(uhw+l  u¯)> (7)
V hk>w 
"X
m=1
m( hk>w+m  ¯k)> (8)
Vzhw 
"X
m=1
m(zhw+m  z¯)> (9)
denote “present value” type expressions.
Equation (6) species a behavioral rule for the household’s choice of cur-
rent consumption based on pre-determined values of initial assets, real in-
terest rates, wage rates, current values of lump-sum taxes and (subjective)
expectations of future values of wages, interest rates, and lump-sum taxes.
Expectations are assumed to be formed at the beginning of period w and,
for simplicity, we assume these to be identical across agents (though agents
themselves do not know this to be the case). Equation (6) can then be viewed
as the behavioral rule for per capita consumption in the economy.
To implement its behavioral rule, the household requires forecasts for
uhw+l> zhw+m> and  hk>w+m= For taxes  hk>w+m (and ¯k) we assume that agents use
“structural” knowledge based on announced government spending rules. For
convenience, we assume balanced budgets, so that k>w+m = jw+m. For uhw+l
and zhw+m we assume that household estimate future values using a VAR-type
model in nw> zw> un>w and yw, with coe!cients updated over time by recursive
least squares (RLS). The detailed procedure is described below in Section 3.
To complete the model, we describe the evolution of the other state vari-
ables, namely zw> un>w> uw> |w and nw+1. Households own capital and labor ser-
vices which they rent to rms. The rm uses these inputs to produce output
|w using the Cobb-Douglas production technology
|w = ywnw q13w >
where yw is the technology shock that follows an AR(1) process
yˆw = yˆw31 + x˜w (10)
with yˆw = (ywy¯)= Here y¯ is the mean of the process and x˜w is an iid zero-mean
process following a normal distribution with constant variance 2x=
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Prot maximization by rms implies the standard rst-order conditions
involving wages and rental rates
zw = (1 )yw(
nw
qw
) and un>w = yw(
qw
nw
)13=
In equilibrium, aggregate private debt esw is zero, so that dw = nw> and market
clearing determines nw+1 from
nw+1 = ywnw q13w + (1 )nw  fw  jw>
where jw is per capita government spending.
For simulations of the model we follow standard procedures and approx-
imate the path using a linearization around the steady state values. To
analyze the impact of policy in the model, we compare the dynamics under
learning to those under RE. At this stage we remark that, as is well known,
under RE and in the absence of a policy change the endogenous variables,
nw+1> fw> qw> zw> un>w> uw can be written as an (approximate) linear function of nw
and yw, e.g. Campbell (1994). The RE solution can be written in the form
of a stationary VAR(1), in the state {ˆ0w 
³
nˆw> yˆw
´
,
μ
nˆw+1
yˆw+1
¶
= E
μ
nˆw
yˆw
¶
+
μ
0
1
¶
x˜w+1> where E =
μ
2 iny
0 
¶
> (11)
with the other variables given by linear combinations of the state; the hatted
values are deviations from the RE deterministic steady state i.e. nˆw = nw  n¯
etc. Note also that under RE forecasts of future zˆw+m and uˆn>w+m are given by
linear combinations of the forecasted future state {ˆhw+m = Em{ˆw.
The focus of this paper is on policy changes. The method for obtaining
the impact of policy changes under RE is standard, e.g. see Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004), Ch. 11 or Mitra, Evans, and Honkapohja (2011) for the
details. We now turn to obtaining the dynamics under learning when there
is a policy change.
3 Learning dynamics
In the standard adaptive learning approach, private agents formulate an
econometric model to forecast future taxes as well as interest rates and wage
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rates, since these are required in order for agents to solve for their optimal
level of consumption. We continue to follow this approach with respect to
interest rates and wage rates, but for forecasting taxes agents are assumed
to understand the future course of taxes implied by the announced policy.
Agents in eect are given structural knowledge of the scal implications of
the announced change in government purchases.5
As argued in the Introduction, we think this is a natural way to proceed,
since changes in agents’ own future taxes have a quantiable direct eect,
while future wages and interest rates are determined through dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium eects. According to the adaptive learning perspective it is
unrealistic to assume that agents understand the economic structure su!-
ciently well to improve on reduced form econometric forecasts of aggregate
variables like wages and interest rates. Thus we assume that when a policy
change is announced, agents calculate V hk>w using the announced changes. To
keep things simple, we assume that the government operates and is known to
operate under a balanced-budget rule. The assumption of balanced budget
with lump-sum taxes is often the maintained assumption in the cited works
in the Introduction for analyzing the eects of changes in government pur-
chases on output. Additionally, with lump-sum taxes, exogenous spending
and appropriate additional assumptions, Ricardian Equivalence holds under
both RE and learning, so that our results hold more generally; see e.g. Evans,
Honkapohja, and Mitra (2011).
The rst policy change we examine in Section 4 is that of a temporary
increase in (per capita) government purchases, j from j¯ to j¯0 for Wj  1
periods, announced to take place immediately at w = 1, i.e.
jw =  w =
½
j¯0, w = 1> ===> Wj  1
j¯, w  Wj>
(12)
i.e., government purchases and taxes are changed in period w = 1 and this
change is reversed at a later period Wj (this is often termed a surprise change
in j in the literature). In our example in Section 4 we set Wj = 9 quarters so
that we are considering a two-year increase in j.
Given their structural knowledge of the government budget constraint and
the announced path of government purchases, the agents can thus compute
5A related approach is followed in Preston (2006) and Eusepi and Preston (2010) in
connection with monetary policy: in some cases agents are assumed to incorporate the
announced interest-rate rule in their forecasts.
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the present value of the increase in their future taxes as
V hk>w =
"X
m=1
m(jw+m  j¯) =
½ 
13 (j¯0  j¯)(1 
Wj3w31), 1  w  Wj  2
0> for w  Wj  1=
Under learning, agents also need to form forecasts of future wages and inter-
est rates since these are needed for their individual consumption choice in (6).
Moreover, they need to form forecasts of these variables without full knowl-
edge of the underlying model parameters. Wage and interest rate forecasts
under learning depend on the perceived laws of motion (PLMs) of agents,
with parameters updated over time in response to the data. We consider
PLMs where future capital, wages, and rental rates depend on the current
capital stock and technological shock, nw and yw. That is, we consider PLMs
of the form
nw+1 = en + dnnnw + dnyyˆw + qrlvh> (13)
zw = ez + dznnw + dzyyˆw + qrlvh> (14)
un>w = eu + dunnw + duyyˆw + qrlvh> (15)
yˆw = yˆw31 + x˜w= (16)
where the PLM parameters en> dnn> dny etc. will be estimated on the basis
of actual data. The nal line is the stochastic process for evolution of the
(de-meaned) technological shock, which for simplicity is assumed known to
the agents. In real-time learning, the parameters in (13), (14), (15) are time-
dependent and are updated using RLS; see for e.g. Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) p. 233. We also assume agents allow for structural change, which
includes policy changes as well as other potential structural breaks, by dis-
counting older data as discussed below.
Under RE, in contrast to learning, agents are assumed to know all of the
underlying parameters involved in the REE solution, i.e. the parameters in
(11), (13), (14), and (15) which they use to form future forecasts of wages
and rental rates. The learning perspective is that assuming such knowledge
is implausibly strong and hence unrealistic.
We remark that in postulating that agents forecast using the PLM (13)
- (16), we are implicitly assuming that they do not have useful information
available from previous policy changes. We think this is generally plausible,
since policy changes are relatively infrequent and since the qualitative and
quantitative details of previous policy changes are unlikely to be the same.
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In particular, previous scal policy changes (if any), of the type considered in
this paper, are likely to have varied in terms of the magnitude and duration of
the change in government spending, and the state of the economy in which
it was announced and implemented. Since older information of this type
would probably have limited value, we assume that agents respond to policy
change by updating the parameters of the PLM (13) - (15) as new data
become available.6
Before discussing how the PLM coe!cients are updated over time using
least-squares learning, we describe how (13) - (15) are used by agents to make
forecasts. Given coe!cient estimates and the observed state (nw> yˆw), equa-
tions (13) and (16) can be iterated forward to obtain forecasts nhw+m and yˆw+m
for m = 1> 2> = = = =Wage and rental rate forecasts zhw+m> uhn>w+m are then obtained
using the relationships (14) - (15) while interest-rate forecasts are given by
uhw+m = 1 + uhn>w+m. Given these forecasts, Vzhw and Vuhw are computed from
(9) and (7), which in turn are used in (6) in determining consumption in the
temporary equilibrium. See the Appendix of Mitra, Evans, and Honkapohja
(2011) for further details.
Parameter updating by agents using RLS learning is as follows. We dene
the time w parameter estimates as
!n>w =
3
C
en>w
dnn>w
dny>w
4
D > !z>w =
3
C
ez>w
dzn>w
dzy>w
4
D > !un>w =
3
C
eu>w
dun>w
duy>w
4
D > }w =
3
C
1
nw
yˆw
4
D =
The RLS formulas corresponding to estimates of equation (13), (14), and
(15) are
!n>w = !n>w31 + U31w }w31(nw  !0n>w31}w31)>
!z>w = !z>w31 + U31w }w31(zw31  !0z>w31}w31)>
!un>w = !un>w31 + U31w }w31(un>w31  !0un>w31}w31)=
Uw = Uw31 + (}w31}0w31 Uw31)=
The gain is assumed to be the same in all of the regressions for simplicity
and is not essential. The initial values of all parameter estimates ! and U
are set to the initial steady state values under RE.
6See Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009) for an example of learning from repeated
policy changes.
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Here it is assumed that agents update parameter estimates using “dis-
counted least squares,” i.e. they discount past data geometrically at rate
1  , where 0 ?  ? 1 is typically a small positive number. In the learn-
ing literature the parameter  is known as the “gain,” and discounted least
squares is also called “constant-gain” least squares.
Constant-gain least squares is widely used in the adaptive learning lit-
erature because it weights recent data more heavily. For a sample see, for
example, Sargent (1999), Orphanides and Williams (2007), Carceles-Poveda
and Giannitsarou (2008), and Eusepi and Preston (2011). In the current con-
text constant gain is particularly appealing since agents will be aware that
policy changes will induce changes in forecast-rule parameter values taking a
possibly complex and time-varying form. The use of a constant-gain rule al-
lows parameter estimates to track changes in parameter values more quickly
than does “decreasing-gain” least squares.
4 Multipliers for Government Purchases
In the present section, we examine the eects of a temporary change in j.
Our general aim is to compare the dynamics obtained under RE and adaptive
learning, focusing on the multiplier for output to judge the eectiveness of
such a policy. We assume that the economy is initially in the steady state
corresponding to j = j¯, and the temporary increase in j is assumed to be
fully credible and announced at the start of period 1, taking the particular
form given in equation (12). An example that is often used is a war that
leads to a temporary increase in military expenditures, as emphasized by
Hall (2009), Barro and Redlick (2011), Ramey (2011b) and Ramey (2011a).
Figure 1 compares the dynamics under RE and learning for key variables.
The variables plotted are capital (nw), gross investment (lw = nw+1(1)nw),
consumption (fw), labor (qw), output (|w) and wages (zw). All variables are
measured in percentage deviations from the (unchanged) steady state. In
period w = 0 all variables are in the steady state. We assume the following
parametric form for the gures:  = 4>  = 0=025>  = 1@3>  = 0=985>  =
0=95> y¯ = 1=359> j¯ = 0=20> and  = 0=04 in the learning rule. These parameter
values conform to the ones used in the RBC literature, see e.g. King and
Rebello (1999) or Heijdra (2009). To aid interpretation y¯ = 1=359 is chosen
to normalize output to (approximately) one, specically |¯ = 1=00057. The
government spending/output ratio is 21%> that of investment/output ratio
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is 20% and that of consumption/output ratio is 59%= x˜w is assumed to be
distributed normally with zero mean and standard deviation x = 0=007,
which is in line with the value used in this literature.
Our choice of the gain parameter  = 0=04 is in line with most of the
literature, e.g. Branch and Evans (2006), Orphanides and Williams (2007),
and Milani (2007). Eusepi and Preston (2011) use a much smaller value for
the gain, but they do not consider changes in policy, for which a larger value
of  is more appropriate.
For the policy exercises, there is an increase in government purchases from
j¯ = 0=20 to j¯0 = 0=21 (a 5% increase) that takes place at w = 1, and lasts until
Wj = 9, i.e. for eight quarters (e.g. a two-year war) in equation (12). We plot
the mean time paths for each endogenous variable over 100> 000 replications
in Figure 1.
Under RE the dynamics are well understood, see Baxter and King (1993)
and Mitra, Evans, and Honkapohja (2011) for details. nw falls as long as the
policy change is in eect and then increases towards the (unchanged) steady
state. fw falls on impact and then increases monotonically towards the steady
state. An important feature of a temporary increase in j is that consumption
smoothing by agents is achieved by a reduction in investment lw. The small
wealth eect due to a temporary, as opposed to a permanent change in j,
leads to small impact eects on fw, qw, and |w. The nw@qw ratio falls on impact
which raises uw and lowers zw on impact. zw continues to be low during the
period of high j, and this reduces qw over time. People maintain a rising
path of fw by reducing lw as long as the period of increased j lasts, which also
results in a falling path of |w over time. Once the period of high j is over, a
rising path of fw can be maintained without the need to reduce capital and
there is an investment boom at this point and nw starts increasing towards
the steady state. The nw@qw ratio starts rising, which lowers uw (raises zw),
leading to further declines in qw as it converges towards the steady state.
Consider now the impacts of the policy under learning. The most marked
dierence under learning compared to RE is the sharper fall in investment
lw on impact. Under RE, agents foresee the path of low wages (high inter-
est rates) in the future which reduces initial consumption more on impact
compared to learning. With expectations of future wages and interest rates
pre-determined, and only a small rise in V hk>w (due to the temporary change),
the reduction in consumption at w = 1 is much smaller under learning than
under RE. (The impact eects on other variables are also muted under learn-
ing for the same reason). Consequently, there is a sharp fall in lw with nw run
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down rapidly. The sizable negative impact eect of fw under RE, followed
by a steady return to steady state is sometimes viewed as implausible. In
contrast under learning the response over the rst ve years is hump-shaped,
followed by some overshooting and eventual convergence. This hump-shaped
response is also seen in |w and qw.
Under learning, although agents correctly foresee the period of higher
taxes, they fail to appreciate the precise form of the wage and price dy-
namics that result from the policy change. The reduction in nw over w =
1> = = = > Wj  1 = 8, leads to lower wages and expected wages, Vzhw , and higher
interest rates and expected interest rates, Vuhw , resulting in a period of ex-
cessive pessimism during the period of high j. The resulting reduction in fw
and increase in qw during this period reverses the fall in lw and stabilizes nw
in excess of RE levels. Then, when the period of high j ends at Wj = 9, the
planned reduction in j leads to a sharp spike in lw and build-up of nw. This
leads to a period of higher wages and expected wages, and lower interest rates
and expected interest rates, and thus to an extended period of correction to
the earlier period of overpessimism, before eventual convergence back to the
steady state.
One way to view these results is that agents fail to foresee the full impacts
of the crowding out or crowding in of capital from government purchases. In
the present case, agents tend to extrapolate the low wages during the period
of increased purchases, which result from the run-down of capital. While
agents understand that their future taxes will fall when the war ends, they
fail to recognize the improvement in wages that will occur after the crowding
in of capital after the war. This is the source of the excessive pessimism
during the war, with a resulting correction after the war ends.
We turn now to a comparison of the government purchase multipliers
under RE and learning. As argued by several authors, e.g. Hall (2009), the
multipliers obtained in RBC models are too small to be consistent with the
data. Hall notes that US evidence from WWII and the Korean wars suggest
multipliers for GDP in the 0.7 to 1.0 range and Ramey (2011a) concludes that
for decit-nanced increases in purchases a range of 0.8 to 1.5 is likely. The
general view is that output multipliers in RBC models are very small, and
unlikely to be consistent with these values. As emphasized e.g. by Leeper,
Traum, and Walker (2011), Keynesian elements need to be included in the
model to obtain an aggregate demand channel and realistic multipliers. An
issue that has not received attention is the potential role for adaptive learning
to provide an additional channel for the multiplier within the standard RBC
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model. We now take up this issue.
Figure 2 shows the results for the output, investment and consumption
multipliers for the policy experiment displayed in Figure 1. In each case
we show both the multiplier viewed as a distributed lag response and the
cumulative multiplier over time. For each graph within Figure 2, the RE and
learning responses are shown. The cumulative multipliers are computed as
a discounted sum using the discount factor . Specically, for the output
multipliers we compute
|pw =
|w  |¯
j¯0  j¯ and |fpw =
Pw
l=1 
l31(|l  |¯)
(j¯0  j¯)
PWj31
l=1 l31
> for w = 1> 2> 3> = = = >
with analogous formulae for the investment and consumption multipliers. We
use discounting to ensure that, e.g., small persistent values of |l  |¯ do not
receive undue weight. Note that for w  Wj  1 the (discounted) cumulative
output multiplier equals one plus the cumulative consumption multiplier plus
the cumulative investment multiplier.
The output multipliers are particularly striking. Although the impact
multiplier is larger under RE than under learning, by quarter 5 the learning
multiplier is larger than the RE multiplier and by quarter 8 the RE multiplier
is near zero, where it remains, while the learning multiplier has increased
substantially, reaching a peak of over 0=7 in quarter 10. The dierence in
multiplier eects is captured well by the (discounted) cumulative multiplier,
which over ve years is more than 0=8 under learning but less than 0=25
under RE. In fact, in the nal period of the gure (year 15), the cumulative
output multiplier is 0=94 under learning and only 0=22 under RE. Strikingly,
the output multipliers obtained under learning are in line with the empirical
evidence cited above.
What accounts for the much larger output multiplier under learning com-
pared to RE? This can be seen from the consumption and investment multi-
pliers. Under both RE and learning, the higher j crowds out consumption,
but there is a hump-shaped response under learning, which declines until
quarter 10. In fact the consumption multiplier eventually (from w = 16)
turns positive, and the long-run cumulative consumption multiplier is sub-
stantially less negative under learning than RE. In the nal period of the
gure, the cumulative consumption multiplier is 0=29 under learning and
0=47 under RE. That is, overall there is signicantly less crowding out of
consumption under learning than under RE.
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The biggest dierence is, however, in the behavior of the investment mul-
tipliers. As discussed earlier, the negative impact eect on investment is
larger under learning than under RE, but this quickly reverses and by quar-
ter 6 the impact on investment is positive under learning and substantially
negative under RE. The cumulative investment multipliers after ve years
are over 0=25 under learning and about 0=4 under RE. Thus, under RE the
overall small cumulative output multiplier re ects crowding out of investment
as well as consumption, while the longer-run cumulative output multipliers
under learning of over 0=94 re ect much less crowding out of consumption
and substantial crowding in of investment.
We remark that adaptive learning can shed some light on the controver-
sial issue of the qualitative response of consumption to a rise in government
purchases. As noted by Ramey (2011b), some empirical studies nd negative
responses of private consumption, in the short to medium term, while others
nd positive responses. Under RE, it is well known that the consumption
multiplier is quite negative in the RBC model, as it is in our Figure 2. As
Hall (2009), p. 198, puts it forcefully “The model is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with increasing and constant consumption when government purchases
rise.” Our study indicates that under learning the distributed lag response of
consumption in the RBC model can eventually become positive (in Figure 2,
this happens from quarter 16 onwards). Thus, under learning we have both
a negative consumption response in the short to medium term and a positive
response thereafter.
Many authors have demonstrated that the purely neoclassical (RBC)
model has no potential to produce realistic output multipliers because of the
signicant crowding out of consumption and investment and that in order to
get acceptable output multipliers consistent with the empirical evidence, one
has to turn to models that blend neoclassical and Keynesian elements. Even
if one accepts that New Keynesian features are part of a realistic mechanism
by which government purchases aect output, it is useful to understand how
large the multiplier can potentially be in RBC models as some of the micro-
foundations are common in neoclassical and New Keynesian models. Our
principal nding is that the introduction of adaptive learning to the RBC
model can by itself rectify the apparent inability of this model to t the
evidence on output multipliers. RBC models with learning are capable of
delivering higher multipliers and indeed are even within the range found in
empirical studies.
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5 Fiscal Stimulus in Recessions
Temporary increases in government spending are often motivated as policies
to expand output and employment during recessions. A growing literature
is reconsidering their eectiveness owing to the large scal stimuli adopted
in various countries in the aftermath of the Great Recession. For example,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Woodford (2011) demon-
strate the eectiveness of scal policy in models with monetary policy when
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rate is reached. Although the main
argument for such policies relies on a demand channel, it is clearly of interest
to examine the impact of a scal stimulus in the RBC model. We are par-
ticularly interested to know if such a policy remains eective under learning
when implemented during a severe recession.
With this in mind, we consider a situation motivated by events during the
Great Recession in the US. The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee
estimates December 2007 as the start of the recession and June 2009 as
the trough, after which the economy again began to expand. Thus the US
economy was in recession during the whole of 2008 and the rst half of 2009.
It is widely agreed that the recession was the most severe in the US since the
Great Depression of the 1930s.
We model the above situation by assuming that the economy is initially
in a steady state (corresponding to say the last quarter of 2007). We capture
the main features of the Great Recession by the following sequence of events:
a sequence of negative two-standard-deviation shocks to the innovation (x˜w)
hits the economy for four periods in the technology equation 10 (i.e. x˜w =
2x in periods w = 1> 2> 3> 4).7 This captures the severity of the recession in
2008. This is followed by the economy being hit by negative one-standard-
deviation shocks to the innovation x˜w in the next two periods (i.e. x˜w = x
in periods w = 5> 6), i.e., the rst half of 2009. Thereafter, from period w  7
onwards the evolution of the economy is governed by equation (10) with x˜w
drawn from a zero mean normal distribution with variance 2x with x =
0=007 as before.
Features of the policy change motivated by the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of February 20098 are captured in the model by
7Of course, we are using negative productivity shocks to capture the various aspects
of the nancial crisis that presumably reduced productivity in the economy as a whole.
More elaborate RBC models would incorporate specic wedges.
8For a summary of the features of the ARRA, see Romer and Bernstein (2009) and
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an increase in j announced in period w = 5. In particular, we assume that at
w = 5 it is announced credibly that there will be an increase in j two quarters
hence from j¯ = 0=2 to j¯0 = 0=21 (a 5% hike in j> approximately 1% of GDP)
for a period of two and half years i.e. from periods w = 7> ===> 16= It is also
announced that j will return to its original level of j¯ from period w = 17
onwards.
The dynamics under learning are shown in Figure 3 for the variables |w>
fw> qw> and lw (the mean paths over 20> 000 replications are reported).9 The
solid black line illustrates the learning paths with the policy change. We also
depict the learning paths without any policy change with the lighter shaded
line. Of course, there are no dierences in the dynamics of the two economies
for the rst year until the policy change is announced at w = 5= The severity
of the recession during the rst year means that |w has fallen by 5=61% as
of w = 4= Once the policy change is announced at w = 5 the dynamics of the
two economies starts to dier, though the eect on |w and fw for the rst few
periods is small.
The impact of the policy builds up steadily after the policy change comes
into eect at w = 7. |w rises over time and is approximately 0=68 % points
higher at w = 17. The dierences in dynamics start getting smaller from
w = 25 onwards but |w continues to be signicantly higher with the policy
change for ve years and stays above the no-policy path throughout the 10
year period plotted in Figure 3. Employment qw also gets a substantial boost
during the time of higher j and in fact is above the steady state from period
11 onwards. The boost in qw and the lower levels of fw during the time of
higher j help explain the signicant expansionary eects of the scal policy
under learning.10
We also plot the corresponding output multipliers for this policy exper-
iment in Figure 4. The left hand panel shows the distributed lag multiplier
and the right hand panel the (discounted) cumulative output multipliers. In
the gure, the solid black line illustrates the multipliers under learning while
the dashed line are the multipliers under the assumption of RE. The output
Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010).
9The policy we consider now is an announced anticipated change in j that takes place
in the near future. For brevity we do not provide the details for RE and learning and refer
the reader to Mitra, Evans, and Honkapohja (2011).
10As discussed in Section 4, investment is to some extent crowded out during the rst
part of the implementation, followed by a recovery during the later part of the implemen-
tation and a surge as the policy ends.
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multipliers are higher under RE compared to learning until w = 9= However,
the onset of the higher j from w = 7 gives a signicant boost to the output
multiplier under learning which goes above RE levels soon after the policy
change and stays higher than RE for the entire period plotted in Figure 4.
At w = 40 the cumulative output multiplier under learning is 0=63 while that
under RE only 0=4=
Although the multipliers under learning are somewhat smaller than in
Section 4, a scal stimulus is clearly eective in raising output and em-
ployment during the recession. Yet again it is seen that the assumption of
RE underestimates the eectiveness of scal policy when agents are learning
adaptively over time. Fiscal policy can be quite eective in the standard
RBC model not only when adopted during normal times but also when un-
dertaken during recessionary times. This is particularly striking, given that
our model does not include price or wage rigidities or liquidity constrained
households.
6 Fiscal Consolidation
Since the 1990s there has been signicant interest in the so-called “non-
Keynesian” eects of scal policy spurred on by the seminal contribution of
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) who studied the two largest scal consolidations
of the 1980s, Denmark in 1983-86 and Ireland in 1987-89. A striking feature
of these contractionary scal policies was that the private sector boomed
rather than fell into the deep recession that many economists and policy
makers had predicted. A voluminous literature arose pointing to examples
of scal consolidations (i.e. permanent reductions in government spending)
displaying similar “non-Keynesian” eects.11
While the empirical literature is vast, there have been some attempts to
explain these eects at a theoretical level, including discussion of whether spe-
cial theories were needed to explain the eects of large scal consolidations.
Most of the focus of this literature has been on an explanation of the eects
of scal policy on private consumption.12 More recently, Alesina, Ardagna,
11For recent discussion and references, see Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz (2002), Alesina,
Perotti, Tavares, Obstfeld, and Eichengreen (1998), Briotti (2005), and Alesina and
Ardagna (2010).
12These attempts include Blanchard (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993), and Perotti
(1999).
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Perotti, and Schiantarelli (2002) have argued that descriptive evidence sug-
gests that increases in private investment (rather than private consumption)
explain a greater share of the response of private-sector GDP growth in large
scal consolidations.13 They nd very little evidence that private investment
reacts dierently during these large scal adjustments than in the “normal”
circumstances. As they remark on p. 586, “This result questions the need
for “special theories” for large versus small changes in scal policy.”
Episodes of large scal consolidations are good examples of situations
which economic agents are unlikely to have experienced earlier in their life-
times. As argued in the Introduction, in such situations it is plausible to
replace RE by the assumption that agents gradually learn about eects of
these policy changes. We will see that the standard RBCmodel with adaptive
learning is able to explain the key features in the behavior of consumption
and investment during these scal episodes.
Fiscal consolidations are typically modeled as a surprise permanent re-
duction in government purchases, starting from steady state at w = 0. We
consider the following scenario. At the beginning of period w = 1> a pol-
icy announcement is made that the level of government purchases will fall
permanently from j¯ = 0=22 to j¯0 = 0=20 (i.e. an almost 10% drop in j).
The policy announcement is assumed to be credible and known to the agents
with certainty. We believe this is a realistic assumption; drastic cuts in pur-
chases are typically implemented when things turn very bad and the public
understands that permanent adjustments are required.
The long run eects on the steady state of a decrease in government con-
sumption are well-known: higher consumption and lower levels of investment,
output, labor, and capital. See e.g. Baxter and King (1993).
The dynamics under RE are also standard; see for instance Baxter and
King (1993), pp. 321-2, Heijdra (2009), chapter 15, or Mitra, Evans, and
Honkapohja (2011). The qualitative dynamics are conrmed by the behavior
of variables under RE in Figure 5. For our purposes, the most relevant issue
is the behavior of fw and lw. Under RE there is a big rise in fw on impact
overshooting the new (higher) steady state followed by a gradual fall towards
this steady state. lw> on the other hand, falls dramatically below the new
(lower) steady state on impact followed by a gradual rise over time. While
13See also Alesina, Perotti, Tavares, Obstfeld, and Eichengreen (1998). Perotti (1999),
footnote 31, concedes that these episodes were characterized by big increases in investment
(and net exports).
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the behavior of fw is consistent with the scal episodes mentioned above, the
behavior of lw is at odds with the empirical literature documented above.
Under learning fw rises on impact, followed by a gradual hump-shaped
increase in its level eventually going above the RE level before monotonically
falling towards the steady state. The most striking dierence from RE is,
however, in the behavior of investment. Instead of the big drop in investment
under RE, the opposite case of a large boom in investment and hence a rising
path of capital occur under learning in the initial periods after the policy
change. Strikingly, this qualitative behavior of lw under learning is consistent
with the empirical evidence cited above.
Why is the behavior of lw dierent under learning compared to RE? At
w = 1, consumption rises because of the decrease in the present value of taxes
V hk>w. As in the case of a temporary change in j, discussed in Section 4, the
impact eects are less under learning than under RE because the paths of
future zw and uw are not fully anticipated. Under learning zhw+v> uhw+v gradually
respond to the data, leading initially to a gradual rise in zhw+v (and fall in
uhw+v) before eventually falling towards the steady state.
As a consequence of the smaller sizes of the impacts on output and con-
sumption at w = 1, the decrease in j necessarily leads to a higher level of
lw under learning than under RE, and in fact a sharp increase in investment
follows. In the periods immediately following the policy change, expecta-
tions of wages and interest rates begin to adjust. Two factors are at work.
The higher capital stock in the periods soon after the policy change leads to
higher forecasts of future wages and lower forecasts of future interest rates
and thus higher Vzhw and lower Vuhw . This leads to a further increase in fw,
and decreases in qw and |w, which results in decreases in lw from its high level
at w = 1. After several periods this process moves nw to an downward path,
accompanied by a rise in qw, and a decrease in nw@qw, driving zw downwards
and uw upwards to their steady state values. The other factor at work is
that over time coe!cient estimates under RLS learning gradually adjust in
response to the shock and the evolution of the data. Eventually the coe!-
cients converge to the values that correspond to the REE values at the new
steady state, so that in the long run there is convergence to the new REE.
Under adaptive learning, the behavior of lw and fw are both in line with
the episodes of scal retrenchment cited above. Investment increases sharply
under learning: in period 1 it is more than 4% points higher than the initial
steady value and continues to stay higher than RE levels for 3 years. fw grows
less rapidly under learning compared to RE levels for six quarters but is then
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signicantly above RE levels for a sustained period. These results for lw and
fw are obtained in the conventional RBC model under learning, without the
need to introduce real frictions or distortionary taxes that are employed in
Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli (2002).
Table 1 summarizes the impact of learning on the behavior of investment,
consumption and output. For each variable the Table gives, over dierent
horizons, the dierence between the cumulative impact under learning and
under RE. This dierence is particularly striking for investment. For exam-
ple, over ve years the cumulative dierence between the level of investment
under learning and under RE amounts to 6.6% of steady state output or
31.9% of steady state investment. Over ve and ten year horizons the cumu-
lative eect on consumption is also greater under learning than under RE.
It follows that the cumulative dierence between the level of output under
learning and under RE, which is equal to the sums of the dierences for in-
vestment and consumption, is also large over all three horizons. Over ten
years this dierence amounts to over 7.5% of steady state output.
It should be noted, however, that scal consolidation leads to a fall in
output and employment under both RE and learning.14 This is an unavoid-
able consequence of the lower steady state level that necessarily accompanies
a permanent reduction in j in the basic RBC model that we are using. How-
ever, qw falls less rapidly under learning and is around 0=7 of a percentage
point higher than RE levels after year one. This feature explains the higher
levels of output under learning compared to RE levels for the entire 10 year
period depicted in Figure 5 and summarized in Table 1.
To summarize, the literature on scal consolidation emphasizes the pos-
sibility of positive eects on both private consumption and, especially, pri-
vate investment resulting from permanent decreases in government spending.
Adaptive learning provides a natural mechanism, operating through expecta-
tions, for a surge in investment immediately following a scal consolidation.
The perceived lower taxes leads to higher consumption and lower employ-
ment through the usual wealth eect. Under learning wages rise less, and
interest rates fall less than they do under RE, so that consumption rises
more gradually and the higher level of personal saving leads to higher levels
of investment over this period.
14Empirical evidence on aggregate eects is reviwed, e.g., in Briotti (2005) and IMF
(2010), chapter 3.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the impact of changes in government purchases
in a standard RBC model with adaptive learning. Methodologically, our
approach has been to assume that households understand the direct eects
of announced changes in government purchases on their after-tax income,
but have imperfect knowledge of the implications of the policy for the future
paths of wages and interest rates. Expectations of these latter variables follow
the adaptive learning approach in which agents estimate and update their
forecasts using statistical learning rules.
Using this approach we study the implications for three inter-related ques-
tions that have been a major focus of recent research. Our main nding
is that the multiplier eects of government purchases in RBC models un-
der learning are much larger than under the standard rational expectations
assumption, and are within the range found in empirical studies. Under
adaptive learning there is less crowding out of consumption and there is sub-
stantial crowding in of investment. We also nd that scal policy, taking the
form of temporary increases in government purchases, is eective in increas-
ing output and employment during severe recessions. Finally, we have seen
that the behavior of both consumption and investment under scal consol-
idations better matches the stylized empirical facts when adaptive learning
is incorporated into the RBC model.
In future work, we aim to study these issues in extended models that allow
for more realistic forms of government nancing, incorporating distortionary
taxes and government debt, and in models that include aggregate demand
channels.
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TABLE
Cumulative 3 years 5 years 10 years
Eects in % RLSRE RLSRE RLSRE
(
P
lw) @|¯ 6=91 6=61 5=28
(
P
fw) @|¯ 1=09 0=19 2=29
(
P
|w) @|¯ 5=82 6=80 7=57
(
P
lw) @~¯ 33=35 31=91 25=48
(
P
fw) @f¯ 1=84 0=32 3=87
Table 1: Cumulative eects on key variables of a scal consolidation.
Cumulative dierence between eects under learning (RLS) and under
rational expectations (RE) in percent relative to steady state.
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Figure 1: Dynamic paths for a two-year (8 periods) increase in government
purchases. The solid lines are the learning paths while the dashed lines are
the RE paths. All variables are measured in percentage deviations from
steady state values. Mean paths over 100,000 simulations.
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Figure 2: Multipliers as a distributed lag response (left hand side) and cumu-
lative multipliers (right hand side), for output, consumption, and investment,
for the increase in government purchases considered in Figure 1. The solid
lines are the learning paths while the dashed lines are the RE paths.
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Figure 3: Dynamic paths showing the impact on major variables of a scal
stimulus announced in the midst of the Great Recession. Mean paths over
20,000 simulations. The solid black line illustrates the learning paths with
the policy change and the lighter shaded line the learning paths without
the policy change. All variables are measured in percentage deviations from
steady state values.
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Figure 4: Output multiplier (distributed lag in left hand panel and cumu-
lative in right hand panel) for the policy experiment illustrated in Figure
3. The solid lines are the learning paths while the dashed lines are the RE
paths.
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Figure 5: Dynamic paths for a surprise permanent reduction in government
spending. The solid lines are the learning paths while the dashed lines are the
RE paths. All variables are measured in percentage deviations from steady
state values. Mean paths over 100,000 simulations.
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